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ABSTRACT
Latin American governments frequently emphasise the democratic
and peaceful order in the region. These claims are based on two
developments: First, except for Cuba, the region has experienced
processes of democratisation since the early 1980s. Second, since
the 1990s, a series of long-lasting civil wars have ended with
negotiated settlements and without a relapse into war. Based on
such a superﬁcial analysis, Latin America can be perceived as a
successful example of the liberal peacebuilding model. However,
although Latin America has democratised and ended wars, it is still
the most violent region in the world. This article argues that
democratisation and peacebuilding focussed rather on formal
changes than on dealing with the structural problems reproducing
diﬀerent manifestations of violence. A focus on the interaction
between both processes provides evidence for the possibilities
as well as the limitations of change.
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The paradox of peace in Latin America
Latin American governments frequently make proud claims regarding the region’s
peacefulness. The 33 governments of the Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States (CELAC), focusing on interstate relations, declared the region a
‘zone of peace’ in 2014 (CELAC 2014). The termination of the civil wars in Central
America (Nicaragua 1990, El Salvador 1992, Guatemala 1996) and Peru (1998) and the
2016 peace accord between the Colombian government and the region’s oldest guerrilla
group, FARC-EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del
Pueblo), raised expectations that the cycle of political violence and civil wars underway
since the late 1940s could come to an end. During a United Nations Security Council
meeting in Bogotá in early May 2017, the Uruguayan ambassador presiding over the
meeting even claimed that the American continent is the only one in the world which
was ‘free of active conﬂicts’ (El Tiempo, 4 May 2017). In a similar tone, the
Organization of American States (OAS) asserts on its homepage: ‘The nations of the
Americas have overcome their civil wars and bloody conﬂicts which unfortunately
characterized the region for many years’.1
CONTACT Sabine Kurtenbach sabine.kurtenbach@giga-hamburg.de
1See http://www.oas.org/en/topics/peace.asp.
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However, the empirical evidence on Latin America’s peacefulness is mixed at best.
The region shows low levels of interstate war, but militarised interstate disputes are
common.2 Examples abound: In 1978, the military regimes in Argentina and Chile were
on the edge of war over the control of the Beagle channel; in the 1980s, Central
American internal conﬂicts came close to escalating into a regional war; and currently,
the border between Venezuela and Colombia is the site of a signiﬁcant amount of sabre-
rattling.
A focus on intrastate or civil war provides an even darker picture as the twentieth
century was characterised by a large number of very violent conﬂicts in most Latin
American countries.3 The Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) and the Colombian
‘Violencia’ (1948–1957) are just the most deadly examples.4 While most civil wars
and armed conﬂicts have ended, 26 of the 54 countries classiﬁed as ‘dangerous places’
by SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) are in Latin America and
the Caribbean due to the high number of violent deaths there (including homicides and
battle-related deaths).5
In the twenty-ﬁrst century, three forms of violence have so far been dominant in
Latin America: First, there has been an upsurge of violence mostly classiﬁed as
‘criminal’.6 Second, repressive state policies and the militarisation of public security
have emerged in countries with and without a prior history of civil war.7 Last but not
least, Latin America has stood out as a region with high levels of selective political
violence against human rights defenders, representatives of social movements and
independent journalists, among others.8 The murders of city councillor, Marielle
Franco, in Rio de Janeiro (2018) and human rights and environmental activist, Berta
Cáceres, in Honduras (2016) are just the most prominent cases. While ‘criminal’
violence dominates the public discourse, repression by the state and selective political
violence are mostly neglected or justiﬁed.9
A similar contradiction between oﬃcial claims and empirical reality can be observed
regarding democracy. Latin American experiences shaped the debate on the third wave of
2Miguel Angel Centeno, ‘Limited War and Limited States’, in Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State
Formation., ed. Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 82–95; Kalevi J.
Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and David R. Mares, Violent
Peace. Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America (New York, 2001).
3Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas & Revolution in Latin America. A Comparative Study of Insurgency and Regimes
since 1956 (Princeton, NJ, 1992).
4Christian Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World (Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010); Fernán E. González González, Poder y Violencia En Colombia, Colección Territorio,
Poder y Conﬂicto (Bogotá, Colombia: CINEP, 2014).
5Author’s own calculation based on the deﬁnition by Mariana Caparini and Gary Militante, ‘Sustaining Peace and
Sustainable Development in Dangerous Places’, SIPRI Yearbook 2017, (2016) and data from the Global Burden of
Armed Violence http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/ﬁleadmin/docs/M-ﬁles/Armed_violence/Small-Arms-Survey-DB-vio
lent-deaths.xlsx.
6Hugo Frühling, Joseph S. Tulchin, and Heather A. Golding, Crime and Violence in Latin America: Citizen Security,
Democracy, and the State (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2003); and UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in Central
America and the Caribbean. A Threat Assessment, United Nations Oﬃce on Drugs and Crime (Wien, 2012), http://www.
unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf.
7PNUD, Seguridad Ciudadana Con Rostro Humano. Informe Regional de Desarrollo Humano 2013–2014 (Nueva York:
Naciones Unidas, 2013).
8Amnesty International, ‘We Are Defending the Land with Our Blood’. Defenders of the Land, Territory and Environment
in Honduras and Guatemala. 1 September 2016, https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/ﬁles/honduras_guate
mala_hrd_-_report_eng.compressed.pdf; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2016 (New York, NY, 2016).
9According to Human Rights Watch Rio de Janeiro’s police killed 1444 persons between January and November of 2018
(https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/19/brazil-police-killings-record-high-rio).
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democratisation.10 Starting with Ecuador in 1978, Latin American countries (except Cuba)
have introduced competitive elections, increasing the possibilities of political participation
for formally excluded groups from the left. In 2001, the OAS adopted the American
Democracy Charter, the 28 articles of which oblige the member states to respect democ-
racy and human rights and strengthen existing OAS instruments for actively defending
democracy.11 While a series of democracy’s deﬁcits such as weak institutions12 and high
levels of corruption13 have been highlighted, the relationship between democracy and
peace has not been debated much.14
This article argues that the minimalist concepts of peace and democracy in Latin
America are caused by and contribute to the neglect of the structural drivers of violence
and authoritarianism. Framing the present as peaceful and democratic allows states to
criminalise actors advocating fundamental change. However, neither the termination
nor the absence of organised political violence in the form of war leads to violence
reduction but to shifting patterns of violence which ultimately reproduce the status quo.
All social orders need to develop formal and informal institutions to control and limit
violence.15 The possibilities for the prevention and containment of violence vary according
to the context and may include the rule of law, control or repression. At least theoretically,
the process of democratisation should mean that the rule of law and its application to all
actors become more important. But the related reforms, such as the creation of an
independent judiciary or a democratically accountable police force, do not happen from
scratch; they interact with existing structures and behaviours shaped by history, culture and
the experience of war and widespread violence.16 A focus on the link between the processes
of democratisation and peacebuilding in Latin America shows that reforms of the institu-
tions crucial for democratic violence control have been limited and mostly path dependent.
As a consequence, security policies have been repressive, undermining civil and political
rights and thus democratisation. The article proceeds as follows: The next section identiﬁes
the relevant factors linking democratisation and peacebuilding. The subsequent section
assesses Latin American experiences, as well as how they have varied. Across the region, we
can observe a mix of liberal, hybrid and authoritarian policies of violence control. The ﬁnal
section inserts Latin American experiences into the more general debate on peacebuilding,
thereby contributing to a better understanding of the problems and challenges international
peacebuilding strategies face.
10Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave of Democratization (Oklahoma University Press, 1993); Juan J. Linz and Alfred
Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist
Europe (JHU Press, 1996); Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, ‘Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule, Vol. 4: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies’ (The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1986); Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems (A Latin American View
with Glances at Some Post-Communist Countries)’, Working Paper (Notre Dame, Ind.: Kellogg Institute, 1993), https://
www3.nd.edu/~kellogg/publications/workingpapers/WPS/192.pdf.
11See OAS (http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm).
12Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo, ‘Building Institutions on Weak Foundations’, Journal of Democracy 24, no. 2
(2013): 93–107, doi:10.1353/jod.2013.0031.
13Kurt Gerhard Weyland, ‘The Politics of Corruption in Latin America’, Journal of Democracy 9, no. 2 (1998): 108–121.
14Notable exceptions are Enrique D. Arias and Daniel M. Goldstein, ‘Violent Democracies in Latin America’ (Durham N.C.:
Duke University Press, 2010); and Jenny Pearce, ‘Perverse State Formation and Securitized Democracy in Latin
America’, Democratization 17 (April 2010): 286–306, doi:10.1080/13510341003588716.
15Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, ‘Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for
Interpreting Recorded Human History’, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
16Nadine Ansorg and Sabine Kurtenbach, ‘Institutional Reforms and Peacebuilding Change, Path-Dependency and Societal
Divisions in Post-War Communities, Studies in Conﬂict, Development and Peacebuilding’ (London: Routledge, 2017).
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The links between peacebuilding and democratisation
The debates on democratisation and peacebuilding have obvious overlaps.17
Theoretically, democracy can be seen as a method of civil and constructive conﬂict
transformation.18 The use of violence should be limited to speciﬁc exceptions, such
as the cases of self-defence or where democratic institutions are allowed to
exercise it.19 The democratic peace debate echoes these claims, arguing that
consolidated democracies do not go to war with each other and are able to prevent
and control violence inside their borders by democratic means.20 The idea of a
liberal peace draws on the experiences in Western Europe and the establishment of
a central state with a legitimate monopoly on violence.21 The state is responsible
for controlling violence via institutions such as the military (external security) and
the police (public security), and for the sanctioning of the illegal use of violence
through the judicial system. In these countries, this process of state formation
historically decreased war and armed conﬂict22 as well as other forms of violence
such as homicide.23
Since the United Nations adopted the Agenda for Peace24 in 1992, the main focus
of the international peacebuilding debate has been the so-called liberal paradigm.25
The main elements of liberal peace are negotiated forms of war termination,26 post-
war democratisation27 and state-building.28 Pointing to a lack of empirical evidence,
the critique of the liberal peacebuilding strategy has focused on the (im)possibility of
reproducing this model in non-Western historical and cultural contexts and under
17In the following, I use the terms ‘democratisation’ and ‘peacebuilding’ for the processes towards democracy and
peace. Obviously, the scope and ambition of these processes depends on the underlying concepts and
deﬁnitions.
18Adam Przeworski, ‘Divided We Stand? Democracy as a Method of Processing Conﬂicts1: The 2010 Johan Skytte Prize
Lecture’, Scandinavian Political Studies 34, no. 2 (June 2011): 168–82, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9477.2011.00265.x.
19John Keane, ‘Violence and Democracy’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
20Seung-Wan Choi, ‘The Democratic Peace through an Interaction of Domestic Institutions and Norms: Executive
Constraints and Rule of Law’, Armed Forces & Society 39, no. 2 (24 August 2011): 255–83, doi:10.1177/
0095327X11418323; and Harvard Hegre et al., ‘Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and
Civil War, 1816–992’, American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (2001): 33–48.
21Norbert Elias, ‘Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation’ (Frankfurt am Main, 1976); Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making
as Organized Crime’, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge University Press,
1985), http://static.ow.ly/docs/0%20Tilly%2085_5Xr.pdf.
22H. Hegre et al., ‘Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?’; Håvard Hegre, ‘Democracy and Armed Conﬂict’, Journal of Peace
Research 51, no. 2 (March 2014): 159–72, doi:10.1177/0022343313512852.
23Susanne Karstedt, ‘Democracy, Crime, and Justice’, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
605, no. 1 (1 May 2006): 6–23, doi:10.1177/0002716206288230; ‘Does Democracy Matter? Comparative Perspectives
on Violence and Democratic Institutions’, European Journal of Criminology 12, no. 4 (2015): 457–81; Gary LaFree and
Andromachi Tseloni, ‘Democracy and Crime: A Multilevel Analysis of Homicide Trends in Forty-Four Countries, 1950–
2000’, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 2006, no. 605 (2006): 26–49, doi:10.1177/
0002716206287169; and Amy E. Nivette and Manuel Eisner, ‘Do Legitimate Polities Have Fewer Homicides? A Cross-
National Analysis’, Homicide Studies 17, no. 1 (2013): 3–26, doi:10.1177/1088767912452131.
24Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping. A/47/277’,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20693723 (accessed June 17, 1992).
25Roland Paris, At War’s End; ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, Review of International Studies 36, no. 02 (April 2010): 337,
doi:10.1017/S0260210510000057.
26Joakim Kreutz, ‘How and When Armed Conﬂicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conﬂict Termination Dataset’, Journal of
Peace Research 47, no. 2 (16 February 2010): 243–50, doi:10.1177/0022343309353108.
27Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., ‘From War to Democracy. Dilemmas of Peacebuilding’, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008); .
28Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., ‘The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace
Operations’, 1st ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); and Timothy D. Sisk, ‘Statebuilding’ (Cambridge, UK;
Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2013).
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the current globalised conditions.29 The debate on the lack of ‘local ownership’ has
provided interesting insights into the problems of external intervention, such as a
lack of recognition of local orders, of the role of local authorities and traditions and
of their relevance for peacebuilding.30 Due to limited empirical evidence of a
successful shortcut to the Western liberal peace in current post-war societies,
many authors highlight the hybrid character of post-war orders31 or the need for
‘adaptive’ or ‘pragmatic’ approaches.32 Others emphasise the contradictions and
challenges of democratisation in the aftermath of war.33 With a focus on ‘illiberal’
and ‘authoritarian’ post-war contexts, some authors claim that liberal peacebuilding
came to an end in the twenty-ﬁrst century.34 In these cases, Sri Lanka and Central
Asia among others, wars were ended via military victory and war recurrence has
been prevented by authoritarian politics of control. Here the main mechanisms of
violence control are related to discursive practices, practices of spatial control and a
political economy of corruption and clientelism. In the short term, this approach
might prevent war recurrence but it is rather unstable in the mid-to-long term as it
produces new conﬂicts. Despite these variations, international actors such as the
United Nations continue to promote inclusive, just and peaceful societies as one of
the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (no. 16).35
These debates have introduced new perspectives on peacebuilding dynamics. First,
they highlight that peace means many diﬀerent things to diﬀerent people.36 Second,
peacebuilding is a complex process and external interventions might be part of the
problem rather than part of the solution. Last not least, there is no ‘one-size-ﬁts-all’
strategy and the outcome of peacebuilding is shaped by the interaction between local
conditions and global contexts as well as the agency of a variety of actors. While this is
important, the focus on peacebuilding classiﬁed by adjectives (liberal, authoritarian,
29Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace’, Third World
Quarterly 34, no. 5 (June 2013): 763–83, doi:10.1080/01436597.2013.800750; Roger Mac Ginty, ed., ‘Routledge
Handbook of Peacebuilding’ (London, New York: Routledge, 2013); and Louise Wiuﬀ Moe and Finn Stepputat,
‘Introduction: Peacebuilding in an Era of Pragmatism’, International Aﬀairs 94, no. 2 (1 March 2018): 293–99,
doi:10.1093/ia/iiy035.
30Vivienne Jabri, ‘Peacebuilding, the Local and the International: A Colonial or a Postcolonial Rationality?’, Peacebuilding
1, no. 1 (March 2013): 3–16, doi:10.1080/21647259.2013.756253; and R. Mac Ginty and O. Richmond, ‘The Local Turn
in Peace Building’.
31Anna K. Jarstad and Roberto Belloni, ‘Introducing Hybrid Peace Governance: Impact and Prospects of Liberal
Peacebuilding’, Global Governance 18, no. 1 (2012): 1–6; Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace’, Security Dialogue 41, no. 4 (23 August 2010): 391–412, doi:10.1177/
0967010610374312; and Oliver P. Richmond and Audra Mitchell, eds., ‘Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday
Agency to Post-Liberalism’ (Houndsmill, Basinkstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
32Cedric de Coning, ‘Adaptive Peacebuilding’, International Aﬀairs 94, no. 2 (1 March 2018): 301–17, doi:10.1093/ia/
iix251; and Moe and Stepputat, ‘Introduction’; Finn Stepputat, ‘Pragmatic Peace in Emerging Governscapes’,
International Aﬀairs 94, no. 2 (1 March 2018): 399–416, doi:10.1093/ia/iix233.
33A.K. Jarstad and T.D. Sisk, ‘From War to Democracy. Dilemmas of Peacebuilding’; R. Paris, ‘At War’s End’; Christoph
Zürcher, ‘Building Democracy While Building Peace’, Journal of Democracy 22, no. 1 (2011): 81–95; and Christoph
Zürcher et al., ‘Costly Democracy: Peacebuilding and Democratization After War’ (Stanford University Press, 2013).
34David Lewis, John Heathershaw, and Nick Megoran, ‘Illiberal Peace? Authoritarian Modes of Conﬂict Management’,
Cooperation and Conﬂict, 2018, 0010836718765902; Giulia Piccolino, ‘Winning Wars, Building (Illiberal) Peace? The Rise
(and Possible Fall) of a Victor’s Peace in Rwanda and Sri Lanka’, Third World Quarterly 36, no. 9 (2 September 2015):
1770–85, doi:10.1080/01436597.2015.1058150; and Monica Duﬀy Toft, ‘Ending Civil Wars. A Case for Rebel Victory?’,
International Security 34, no. 4 (2010): 7–36.
35United Nations, ‘Agenda for Sustainable Development’, 21 October 2015.
36This is highlighted among others in the ‘everyday peace indicator project’, see Pamina Firchow and Roger Mac Ginty,
‘Measuring Peace: Comparability, Commensurability, and Complementarity Using Bottom-Up Indicators’, International
Studies Review 19, no. 1 (2017): 6–27.
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hybrid and local) runs the risk of creating new silos and complicates comparisons
across these contexts.
Processes of peacebuilding and democratisation are historically open – that is, they
are neither linear nor is their outcome necessarily the same as that in Western Europe.
Based on this assumption, the analysis of peacebuilding in speciﬁc contexts needs to
take into account the whole range of possibilities from liberal to authoritarian and
hybrid strategies. Analysing peacebuilding and its outcomes along a spectrum has
several advantages:
First, this approach is not normative and does not predict a speciﬁc outcome. This is
important as we can observe a mix of various elements in speciﬁc contexts. At the same
time, the spectrum is a useful tool for comparative assessment and the explanation of
variations in outcomes.
Second, the idea of a spectrum also broadens our concept of peace beyond the
absence of war, putting the reduction of diﬀerent forms of direct physical violence (e.g.
state repression and homicide) at the core of peacebuilding. While this adheres to
Galtung’s ‘negative peace’ concept,37 it makes the comparison between post-war socie-
ties and other societies with diﬀerent levels of violence possible.38 We can thus include a
peace perspective on transformation processes beyond transformations out of war.
Third, the idea of a spectrum acknowledges the fact that a clear-cut distinction between
‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal’ or ‘war’ and ‘peace’ is often not possible.39 Without assuming a
temporal sequence, it is quite obvious that the factors important for war onset or termina-
tion can diﬀer from those important for non-war-recurrence and ‘quality peace’.40
Fourth, as an analytical tool, the spectrum enables us to assess the dynamics and the
direction of peacebuilding processes over time and beyond transitions from war and
armed conﬂict.
Starting from these assumptions, Latin American countries are very interesting cases
for studying the interaction of democratisation and peacebuilding. With the exception
of Cuba, Latin American political systems are (or were until recently) rated as demo-
cratic. They hold regular free and fair elections to select government; provide a
minimum of cheques and balances between the executive, the legislative and the
judiciary and guarantee – at least on paper – fundamental civil and political rights.41
Although there is growing debate on possible reversals regarding democracy,42 com-
pared to other regions of the Global South, Latin America is still perceived as rather
37Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–91, doi:10.1177/
002234336900600301.
38There is broad evidence on the link between various forms of violence. Christian Davenport, ‘State Repression and the
Domestic Democratic Peace (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)’ (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
39David Rampton and Suthaharan Nadarajah, ‘A Long View of Liberal Peace and Its Crisis’, European Journal of
International Relations 23, no. 2 (June 2017): 441–65, doi:10.1177/1354066116649029; and David Keen, ‘War and
Peace: What’s the Diﬀerence?’, International Peacekeeping 7, no. 4 (December 2000): 1–22, doi:10.1080/
13533310008413860.
40Peter Wallensteen, ‘Quality Peace. Peacebuilding, Victory, & World Order’, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press,
2015); A similar argument is made regarding democratisation: Sebastián L. Mazzuca, ‘Access to Power Versus Exercise
of Power Reconceptualizing the Quality of Democracy in Latin America’, Studies in Comparative International
Development 45 (2010): 334–57, doi:10.1007/s12116-010-9069-5.
41See the main international indices such as Polity IV (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html), Freedom
House (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018) and the Bertelsmann Transformation
Index (https://www.bti-project.org/en/home/).
42Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, ‘The Myth of Democratic Recession’, Journal of Democracy 26, no. 1 (2015): 45–58,
doi:10.1353/jod.2015.0007.
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successful. With the end of the region’s longest internal war in Colombia in 2016,43 the
cycle of internal wars might have ended. Latin America shows not only high levels of
variation but also some commonalities between those countries that have experienced
war and those that have not: on the surface, Latin American experiences seem to mirror
a liberal peace, as most countries have remained inside the electoral democracy frame
and wars have ended. At the same time, there is evidence across the region of a mix of
liberal, hybrid and illiberal policies to control violence. The following section analyses
this variation.
Varieties of peacebuilding in Latin America
Peacebuilding and democratisation are complex and non-linear processes. The debates
on liberal, hybrid and illiberal peace outlined above identify changes in the political
system, the economy and societal relations that are relevant for the prevention and
control of violence. What are the core elements discussed in these approaches?
The liberal peacebuilding approaches emphasise the importance of competitive
elections44 as a major element to increase political participation, while executive
restraints45 are important between elections. The rule of law and accountability for all
actors, including elites,46 should also contribute to liberal peace. In the economy, at
least some intention to work towards the reduction of existing inequalities must exist as
democratic regimes are based on the promise of equality.47
Authoritarian conﬂict management48 is not just based on the absence of these
‘liberal’ conditions or the dominance of ‘illiberal’ elements but also relies on a set of
speciﬁc control strategies including state propaganda and the control of information,
military and civilian modes of controlling space, and the hierarchical distribution of
economic resources for speciﬁc constituencies.
The following Table 1 illustrates the variations in some of these conditions for
peacebuilding across Latin America with a snapshot for the year 2018 based on
comparative quantitative data.49 A more in-depth study would need to look at time
series and changes in time, but this goes beyond the scope of this article. As I do not
discuss causality but want to illustrate the variation, the following Table 1 includes data
on elections, the rule of law, welfare regimes, corruption and inequality, as well as on
the perception of security and the levels of lethal violence. The colours do not indicate
43The armed conﬂict with another guerrilla group, the Ejército Nacional de Liberación (ELN), is still ongoing but not at
the national level. See Andrés Aponte, ‘En El Laberinto Eleno: Perspectivas de Guerra y Paz’, Cien Días Vistos Por CINEP/
PPP no. 92 (2018): 32–6.
44Przeworski, ‘Divided We Stand?’.
45T. Clark Durant and Michael Weintraub, ‘How to Make Democracy Self-Enforcing after Civil War: Enabling Credible yet
Adaptable Elite Pacts’, Conﬂict Management and Peace Science 31, no. 5 (November 2014): 521–40, doi:10.1177/
0738894213520372.
46D. North et al. see this as a ‘doorstep condition’ on the way from limited to open access orders; see Violence and
Social Orders, 154–8.
47Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, ‘Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of
Democratic Rule’, American Political Science Review 106, no. 03 (August 2012): 495–516, doi:10.1017/
S0003055412000287.
48Lewis, Heathershaw, and Megoran, ‘Illiberal Peace?’ 0010836718765902.
49These data come from mainstream liberal organizations and institutions as we lack alternative data at the regional
level. The analysis of authoritarian mechanisms is usually based on case studies with qualitative data.
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objective levels but illustrate the comparison of higher or lower scores within this
sample.
An interesting picture emerges illustrating the variations of peace and democracy:
● The most peaceful and democratic countries, Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica,
seemed to be able to change their development path despite dictatorship (Chile
1973–1990 and Uruguay 1973–1985) and civil war (Costa Rica 1948). Today, they
not only conduct free and fair elections but also receive high ratings for the rule of
law and have the most progressive welfare regimes. Levels of corruption and
violence are low. Uruguay, moreover, is a country with low inequality in the
Latin American context. These three countries seem to resemble patterns high-
lighted currently in the liberal peacebuilding approach. What is astonishing is that
despite comparatively low levels of violence in all three countries, perceptions of
danger regarding personal safety are highly prevalent.
● Nicaragua exhibits some patterns of successful authoritarian conﬂict management
as there are high levels of corruption and the democratic governance scores are
low, but until 2017, violence has not been a major issue. In 2018, however, at least
300 persons were killed and 2000 injured when government forces repressed anti-
government demonstrations.50
● Another more or less consistent hybrid pattern is related to the most violent
societies, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras and El
Salvador. Here, we can ﬁnd elements of both the liberal as well as the authoritarian
Table 1. Peacebuilding conditions in Latin America.
Free and Fair 
Elections








Argentina 9 7 6,5 40 40,6 52,1 5,2
Brazil 9 7,8 7 35 53,3 62,7 25
Chile 9 9,5 8 67 46,6 33 2,7
Uruguay 10 10 9 70 39,7 37,7 11,2
Paraguay 8 5,5 5 29 48,8 37 5,2
Bolivia 9 5,8 5 29 44,6 39,5 6,3
Peru 7 6,5 5,5 35 43,3 38,7 7,8
Ecuador 6,5 4,8 5,5 34 44,7 45,4 5,7
Colombia 7 6,5 6,0 36 49,7 34,7 25
Venezuela 4 2,8 5,5 18 46,9 58 81,4
Panama 8 6 6 37 49,9 37,5 9,7
Costa Rica 10 9,5 8 56 48,3 46,4 11,7
Nicaragua 5 3,8 5 25 46,2 24,5
Honduras 6 4,8 4 29 50,5 35,8 40
El Salvador 9 6 5,5 35 38 48,5 51
Guatemala 6 4,8 4 27 48,3 37,1 22,4
Mexico 7 5 5,5 28 43,4 49,5 25,8






(c) https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI Data 2017 or closest year, Venezuela 2006.
(d) How frequently are you preoccupied that you will be a victim of violence – percentage responding always
or nearly always? http://www.latinobarometro.org/latOnline.jsp.
(e) https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/analisis/balance-de-insight-crime-sobre-los-homicidios-en-2018/.
50United Nations Human Rights Oﬃce of the High Commissioner, Human Rights Abuses and Violence in the Context of
Protests in Nicaragua 18 of April – 18 of August 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/NI/
HumanRightsViolationsNicaraguaApr_Aug2018_EN.pdf.
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approaches. Elections are more or less fair and free, but they coexist alongside high
levels of impunity and clientele politics, corruption and discourses of fear. An
interesting outlier is the comparatively low level of inequality in El Salvador showing
that there is no direct causal relation between inequality and violence.
● The other Latin American countries carry out relatively fair and free elections but
don’t have equivalent levels of rule of law and welfare regimes. They also have high
scores for corruption, inequality, insecurity and violence.
● In relation to the historical experience of authoritarianism versus civil war or
armed conﬂict, no clear pattern exists.
How can we explain this variation? At the crossroads between peacebuilding and
democratisation, there are two commonalities across the region: negotiated transitions
and the neoliberal development model.
Theoretically, negotiated transitions out of war and authoritarianism can be seen as a
step towards the development of a consensus on the future. The debate on the inﬂuence
of the mode of transition on peace and democracy is inconclusive.51 A recent DfID
(Department for International Development) study52 on elite bargains emphasises the
importance of the underlying power relations for diﬀerent outcomes. Studies based on
historical institutionalism show that reforms do not emerge from scratch but are shaped
by prior experiences and societal contexts.53 Latin America’s transitions from authoritar-
ian to democratic systems, as well as its out-of-war transitions (except for Peru’s), were
based on elite pacts. While the ambitions outlined in the peace agreements in El Salvador
and Guatemala were high, the reforms were layered and gradual rather than profound.
Impunity is a good example of the eﬀect of elite pacts on the rule of law in both transitions.
Many Latin American societies made huge eﬀorts to document the gross human rights
violations that took place during the wars or the authoritarian regimes, through the establish-
ment of truth commissions. But holding the perpetrators accountable was a diﬃcult process
as many countries passed amnesties.54 As a consequence, high levels of personnel continuity
persist within the state’s security institutions (military, police and judiciary). Even where
peace agreements included provisions on the vetting ofmilitary oﬃcers, as inGuatemala or El
Salvador, change was slow and came only after signiﬁcant external pressure.55 Across the
region, judicial institutions are weak and subject to political inﬂuence and corruption;
problems of access to justice persist.56
51Toft, ‘Ending Civil Wars’, 7–36; L. Nathan and M. D. Toft, ‘Civil War Settlements and the Prospects for Peace’, International
Security 36, no. 1 (2011): 202–10; and Peter Grahl Johnstad, ‘Nonviolent Democratization: A Sensitivity Analysis of How
Transition Mode and Violence Impact the Durability of Democracy’, Peace & Change 35, no. 3 (2010): 464–82.
52Christine Cheng, Jonathan Goodhand, and Patrick Meehan, ‘Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project’, n.d., 87.
53Ansorg and Kurtenbach, Institutional Reforms. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, ‘A Theory of Gradual Institutional
Change’, in Explaining Institutional Change. Ambiguity, Agency, and Power., ed. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1–37.
54Nevertheless, there were signiﬁcant eﬀorts to hold the perpetrators accountable and some success, e.g. in Argentina
and, at least symbolically, in Guatemala.
55William D. Stanley, ‘Building New Police Forces in El Salvador and Guatemala: Learning and Counter learning’,
International Peacekeeping 6, no. 4 (1999): 113–34, doi:10.1080/13533319908413801; and Charles T. Call, ‘The
Mugging of a Success Story: Justice and Security Sector Reform in El Salvador’, in Constructing Justice and Security
after War (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 29–67.
56William Ratliﬀ and Edgardo Buscaglia, ‘Judicial Reform: The Neglected Priority in Latin America’, The ANNALS of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 550, no. 1 (1 March 1997): 59–71, doi:10.1177/
0002716297550001005; and Juan E Méndez, Guillermo O’Donnell, and Paulo S Pinheiro, ‘The (Un) Rule Of Law and
the Underprivileged in Latin America’ (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999).
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A second important condition across the region was the dominance of the neoliberal
development model during the transition to democracy. Across the region, this reduced
the already meagre capacities of Latin American states for social redistribution and the
reduction of inequality, although speciﬁc results in relation to welfare systems vary
according to historic trajectories. In 1994, the United Nations’ mediator in El Salvador,
Alvaro de Soto, and economist, Graciana del Castillo, warned against the negative
consequences of neoliberal policies for peace.57 Despite advances in poverty reduction
and the resource boom of this century’s ﬁrst decade, Latin America still is the most
unequal region of the Global South.58 Seen from the perspective of both developments,
path dependency prevailed over the impetus for change and traditional elites were able
to maintain or modernise their power.59
Both developments directly aﬀected peacebuilding: Inequality is a major driver of
criminal and social violence60; elite pacts supported impunity and contributed to the
militarisation of public security across the region.61 Sending the military to the streets
not only to combat crime but also to crush social protest violates fundamental political
and civil rights. In mid-2018, this was even true for countries that seemed to have
reformed their security institutions successfully – for example, Nicaragua, where the
police squashed student protests, or Argentina, where the government planned to send
the military to the street against G20 protesters.62 Violence on the part of state security
institutions is highly consequential for the democratisation process as it produces cycles
of violence and repression that undermine democracy.63 Selective political violence
targeting representatives of social movements, human rights defenders, independent
judges, attorneys and journalists is a consequence. Figure 1 illustrates the increase in
murdered human rights activists documented in the annual reports of Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch between 2007 and 2017.
Although there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in these developments across the region,
they are mostly in degree rather than substance. Some problems are more profound in
countries with a history of civil war and armed conﬂict, where the promises of war
termination rarely translated into a peace beyond the absence of war. The peace
agreements in El Salvador and Guatemala, for example, did help to open up participa-
tion in the political system. In El Salvador, candidates from the former guerrilla FMLN
57Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, ‘Obstacles to Peacebuilding’, Foreign Policy, no. 94 (1994): 69, doi:10.2307/
1149132. See also James K. Boyce, ‘Adjustment toward Peace: Economic Policy and Post-War Reconstruction in El
Salvador’ (San Salvador: UNDP, 1995).
58Maxine Molyneux, ‘The “Neoliberal Turn” and the New Social Policy in Latin America: How Neoliberal, How New?: The
Neoliberal Turn and the New Social Policy in Latin America’, Development and Change 39, no. 5 (28 October 2008):
775–97, doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2008.00505.x; and Evelyne Huber et al., ‘Politics and Inequality in Latin America and
the Caribbean’, American Sociological Review 71, no. 6 (December 2006): 943–63, doi:10.1177/000312240607100604.
59Benedicte Bull, ‘Governance in the Aftermath of NeoLiberalism: Aid, Elites and State Capacity in Central America’,
Forum for Development Studies 43, no. 1 (2 January 2016): 89–111, doi:10.1080/08039410.2015.1134647.
60Sean Fox and Kristian Hoelscher, ‘Political Order, Development and Social Violence’, Journal of Peace Research 49, no.
3 (1 May 2012): 431–44, doi:10.1177/0022343311434327.
61Jenny Pearce, ‘Elites and Violence in Latin America. The Logic of a Fragmented State’, Violence, Security, and Peace
Working Papers, no. 1 (2018).
62On Nicaragua see United Nations Human Rights Oﬃce of the High Commissioner (2018) FN 50, on Argentina https://
www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-44931542.
63Sabine C. Carey, ‘The Use of Repression as a Response to Domestic Dissent’, Political Studies 58, no. 1 (February 2010):
167–86, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00771.x; José Miguel Cruz, ‘Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central
America: The Survival of the Violent State’, Latin American Politics and Society 53, no. 4 (2011): 1–33; and Sabine
Kurtenbach, ‘Tendencias de Las Políticas de Seguridad En América Latina Al Principio Del Siglo XXI1’, Revista Fuerzas
Armadas y Sociedad 16, no. 2 (2001): 3–14.
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(Frente Martí para la Liberación Nacional) were even elected to the oﬃce of president
in 2009 and 2014. However, the peace processes and democratisation were unable to
change the patterns of social marginalisation, especially regarding poor people, youth
and indigenous groups.65
As part of Latin America’s minimalist understanding of peace, governments highlight the
peacefulness and democratic character of politics in the region. CELAC, theOAS andUruguay’s
ambassador to theUnitedNations are just a few examples. Seen from a government perspective,
hijacking the discourse of peace and democracy serves a double purpose:
First, it helps criminalise social and political opponents (and their actions) who are not
limited to formal institutions such as elections or who contest the social status quo. At the
same time, political elites tend to downplay the political inﬂuence of criminal organisations
despite calling for ‘“tough on crime” or “law and order” policies’.66 Latin America provides
extensive evidence of the related processes of escalation of repression and violence by state
and non-state actors.
Second, the discourses are an instrument to keep external intervention regarding
democracy and peacebuilding to a minimum. Current examples abound: Venezuela and
its allies have rejected a debate within the OAS on the increasing authoritarianism in the
country. On 31 August 2018, Nicaragua withdrew its invitation to the Oﬃce of the United
Nations High Representative for Human Rights to investigate the violence between the
police and protesters. And last not least, Guatemala’s president has tried to get rid of the
United Nations mission to combat impunity and corruption (Comisión Internacional
Figure 1. Number of human rights activists murdered in Latin America, 2007–2017.64
64I thank Antonia Jordan for research assistance and the compilation of data based on the annual reports of Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
65Christine J. Wade, Captured Peace: ‘Elites and Peacebuilding in El Salvador., Ohio RIS Latin America Series’ (Athens, Ohio:
Ohio University Press, 2016); and Sabine Kurtenbach, ‘Judicial Reform – A Neglected Dimension of SSR in El Salvador’,
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, online ﬁrst (2018) doi:10.1080/17502977.2018.1517112.
66Nicholas Barnes, ‘Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence’,
Perspectives on Politics 15, no. 04 (December 2017): 979, doi:10.1017/S1537592717002110.
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Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala, CICIG). In all three cases, the presidents and their
governments are themselves the subject of investigations related to the violation of
national as well as international democratic norms through violence and corruption.
In a nutshell, Latin American experiences appear to provide evidence of the limits of
gradual change and the persistence or reproduction of historically engrained author-
itarian conﬂict management practices. Using the spectrum of peacebuilding strategies as
an analytical tool helps to identify the underlying contradictions and dynamics. Elites
exploit international discourses on democracy and peace to further their economic,
political and social interest. They criminalise the political opposition against the status
quo as well as marginalised groups such as youths or indigenous communities. The
ﬁnal section summarises what we can learn from Latin American experiences for global
approaches to peacebuilding.
Latin American contributions to the global debate
Latin American experiences show how speciﬁc peacebuilding approaches are not only
shaped by local contexts but also by the patterns of macro-regional development and
path dependence regarding institutional change. Democratisation as progress towards
conﬂict-processing institutions is limited to contexts or windows of opportunity where
local actors support or promote an agenda of change. In Guatemala, for example,
advances in the rule of law were possible as long as external support for such measures
had allies inside local institutions (the Attorney Generals Claudia Paz y Paz and Thelma
Aldana). When this changed in 2018, the President moved to dismantle the CICIG and
has not really encountered international resistance. Most countries formally comply
with minimum international standards (elections) but sideline or undermine those
institutions or processes that could change the existing power relations. The corruption
charges against the Guatemalan president and the withdrawal of the CICIG head’s visa
are an interesting illustration of this. Path dependence prevails most of all in relation to
social and political conﬂicts framed as ‘criminal’.
Accordingly, two interrelated arguments can be made: First, neither democratisation nor
the termination of the civil wars has changed the deeply ingrained social inequality in many
parts of the region.67 Participation in violence was a means of political change during the
twentieth century but petty crime or drug traﬃcking is today a means of survival or even
upward social mobility. Despite many diﬀerences between these periods – such as the lack of
ideology and diﬀerences in the global environment – young, marginalised youth have
provided the bulk of the rank and ﬁle in organised violence. Second, state repression, selective
political violence and corruption have allowed traditional elites to maintain and reproduce
their unequal economic and social status quo despite democratisation. The violence against
human rights defenders and social activists (see Figure 1) is just the tip of the iceberg. The
result of these developments has been framed as ‘perverse state formation’68; as ‘criminal
governance’,69 from a more anthropological and local perspective, or as ‘violent
67UNDP, ‘Acting on the Future: Breaking the Intergenerational Transmission of Inequality’.
68J. Pearce, ‘Perverse State Formation and Securitized Democracy in Latin America’.
69Enrique D. Arias, ‘The Dynamics of Criminal Governance: Networks and Social Order in Rio de Janeiro’, Journal of Latin
American Studies 38 (27 April 2006): 293, doi:10.1017/S0022216X06000721; and Criminal Enterprises and Governance in
Latin America and the Caribbean. (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
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democracies’.70 In the context of minimalist concepts of peace, formally democratic regimes
and high levels of violence not only coexist but are also intertwined shaping the limits of peace
in Latin America.
The comparative analysis of Latin American experiences shows that a broader
conceptualisation of peace as violence reduction is fruitful as it allows for the identiﬁca-
tion of continuity and change. A crucial element of enhancing the scope of peace in
Latin America (and probably elsewhere) is the recognition of full citizenship.71 The
current patterns of selective political violence in Latin America are obviously linked to
the process of change. The problem with liberal peace is not its emphasis on universal
human rights but the lack of protection for those who claim and advocate for these
rights. The gap between the formal guarantees of civil and political rights and their
acknowledgement and protection must be closed. This would provide a basis for
inclusive policies able to reduce the high levels of political and social inequality. The
current backlash against formerly marginalised groups (women, youth, indigenous and
LGTBI) in Brazil and elsewhere shows how contentious these changes are. Independent
judicial institutions are key to subordinating elites from all political backgrounds to the
rule of law. Given the legacies of war and violence, even selective political violence
endangers non-violent actions for change.
Politically this means that despite their limited inﬂuence, international actors need to
insist on the implementation of peace accords and the guaranteeing of civil and political
rights to prevent these being circumvented or undermined. While this challenges the
sovereignty and the state-centric approach, non-enforcement may lead to renewed
escalation of violence along political lines. The high levels of selective political violence
in Central America and Colombia (see Figure 1) show how dangerous this might be.
Across academic and policy debates, Latin American experiences connect with those
from other world regions and the recent innovations in the peacebuilding debate.72 But
Latin American experiences highlight that internal and external actors need a broader
perspective of peace beyond the absence of war as a compass for the future. Otherwise,
local power relations may instead support a relapse into the authoritarian and violent
practices of the past or the countries may remain stuck in transition. Peacebuilding
choices are not necessarily dichotomous and limited to liberal or illiberal choices. Latin
American experiences show that there is an important grey zone and high levels of
variation. But the end of war or of an authoritarian regime is not necessarily a tipping
point towards change. Theory and policy approaches need to systematically take into
account the fact that neither peacebuilding nor democratisation proceed as linear
processes but are rather highly contested. Outcomes are shaped by the context-speciﬁc
interaction between global norms, local contexts and the diverging goals and interests
of a multitude of actors.
Peace and democracy need broad coalitions based on the acknowledgement of
human rights for all. The right to physical integrity stands at the core and policies of
comprehensive violence reduction are a necessary basis for inclusive, just and peaceful
70E.D. Arias and D. Goldstein, ‘Violent Democracies in Latin America’.
71For a similar argument on the relation between violence, peace and hierarchies of citizenship see Robin Luckham,
‘Whose violence, whose security? Can violence reduction and security work for poor, excluded and vulnerable
people?’ Peacebuilding 5, no.2, (2017): 99–117, doi:10.1080/21647259.2016.1277009.
72L. Moe and F. Stepputat, ‘Introduction’; C. de Coning, ‘Adaptive Peacebuilding’.
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societies as envisioned in Sustainable Development Goal no. 1673 and the United
Nations agenda of sustaining peace.74 These documents have developed from and
transcended the liberal tradition and as such are an important reference to facilitate
change towards a peace beyond the absence of war. While change in this direction is a
long-term endeavour, violence is a powerful instrument for reproducing the status quo.
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